

A SURVEY OF ALLIED NATIONS

THE ALLIED LEDGER

How nations keep, and break, commitments to
Wartime Allies and the case for the Global
Alliance principles.

Produced in partnership with Local Staff International.

Shawn VanDiver, President and Founder of AfghanEvac
Prof. Sara de Jong, University of York, Co-Founder of Local Staff
International

Julia Aitken, Board Member, Local Staff International

Jon Feltham, Board Chairman, Aman Lara

An AfghanEvac Special Report · August 12, 2026

#AFGHAN
EVAC

LSI
LOCAL STAFF
INTERNATIONAL



The Allied Ledger

**How Nations Keep, and Break, Commitments to Wartime Allies and the Case for
the Global Alliance Principles**

A Companion to "The Unfinished Mission"

By

Shawn VanDiver, President and Founder, AfghanEvac

Prof. Sara de Jong, University of York | Co-Founder, Local Staff International

Julia Aitken, Board Member, Local Staff International

Jon Feltham, Board Chair, Aman Lara

An AfghanEvac Special Report | August 12, 2026

A letter from the authors

Five years after Kabul fell, the question this report asks is larger than any one country: what does a nation owe the people who serve its missions abroad, and does it keep that promise when the war ends. We come to this from different places. One of us built a veterans-led movement to hold the United States to its word. The other has spent years researching how governments across the world have kept or broken faith with their local staff, in Afghanistan and across half a century of conflicts before it. We arrived at the same conclusion, and we wrote this together because the answer does not belong to any one nation.

The pattern is not an accident. Read across the coalition and across the century, the story is remarkably consistent. Nations that committed early, wrote their obligations into law, and sustained the will to honor them protected the people who stood with them, and were stronger for it. Nations that improvised, that narrowed eligibility to interpreters alone, that demanded paperwork a war had already destroyed, or that relied on a single airlift with no pathway behind it, left their allies exposed, and in the worst cases got them killed. The same courts, the same document tests, the same last-minute scrambles recur from Algeria to Bosnia to Iraq to Afghanistan. So do the rare successes, which is the more important point: this is a solved problem whenever governments decide to solve it.

This is not a historical curiosity. Across 2024 and 2025, one government after another closed intake, froze processing, or terminated its program outright, at the very moment Afghans sheltering in third countries faced deportation back to the Taliban. The people in these pages are not statistics to us. They are interpreters in hiding, families split across borders, and the guards, fixers, and judges who believed a promise. This ledger sets their record down, partner by partner and case by case, so that the next government does not have to learn it the hard way.

The standard already exists: the Global Alliance Principles, operationalized through Local Staff International's Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions. It asks nothing that the best of these programs has not already shown to be possible. We ask you to read the record, and then to help us make that standard the way these things are done, before the next mission begins rather than after the next collapse.

Shawn VanDiver, President and Founder, AfghanEvac

Prof. Sara de Jong, University of York, Co-Founder, Local Staff International

Julia Aitken, Board Member, Local Staff International

Jon Feltham, Board Chair, Aman Lara

Contents

A letter from the authors.....	2
Executive Summary.....	4
The Unfinished Mission: The International and Historical Context.....	5
The case for the Global Alliance Principles and Guidelines for the Rights & Protection of Local Staff in International Missions.....	6
The Implications of the Failure to Protect.....	9
The country ledger: International Context.....	10
United States.....	10
Canada.....	10
United Kingdom.....	11
Germany.....	11
Australia.....	11
Netherlands.....	12
France.....	12
The rest of the coalition.....	14
The longer record: Historical Context.....	15
The Assyrian Levies, Iraq, 1933.....	15
Filipino veterans of World War II.....	15
The Moluccans, Indonesia, 1951.....	16
The Harkis, Algeria, 1962.....	16
The Montagnards of Vietnam.....	18
The Hmong of Laos.....	18
The Kurds, Iraq, 1991.....	18
Iraq, 2007 onward.....	19
Echoes across the century.....	20
Cross-cutting design lessons.....	21
What the record teaches.....	23
What you can do.....	24
Methodology and sourcing.....	25
Sources.....	26

Executive Summary

Every nation that fights a war abroad depends on local people to make the mission work, and every nation eventually faces the same question when the war ends: what does it owe them? This report is a ledger of how that question has been answered, across the coalition that served in Afghanistan and across a century of precedent before it. The record is remarkably consistent. Where governments made durable commitments and sustained the political will to honor them, protection worked, and often became a lasting national asset, as the United States found after Vietnam. Where they improvised, narrowed eligibility to interpreters alone, demanded documents that war destroys, or relied on one-time airlifts with no pathway behind them, they left allies behind, sometimes with fatal consequences.

The coalition scorecard is sobering. The United States built the largest wartime-ally programs in history, roughly 160,000 Special Immigrant Visas issued and about 178,000 Afghans approved and stranded in the pipeline, and then froze issuance outright at the start of 2026. The United Kingdom resettled some 38,600 people through three consolidated routes and has since closed them for new applications. Canada met its 40,000-person commitment, then capped and ended intake. Germany told roughly 45,000 Afghans they would be admitted and moved more than 33,000, before a new government froze all but the legally binding local-staff track. Australia wound up its program by mid-2024 on a two-step design that left certified allies without a visa. France, the Netherlands, and much of the rest of the coalition protected narrow categories. By 2025 and 2026, nearly every coalition program had closed intake, frozen processing, or been terminated, and often all at once.

The longer record shows this is neither new nor inevitable. From the Assyrian Levies of 1933 and the Harkis of Algeria to the Montagnards and Hmong of Southeast Asia, the Kurds of 1991, and the interpreters of Bosnia and Iraq, the same failures recur: eligibility narrowed to interpreters alone, proof demanded that war has already destroyed, and courts left to do what governments would not. But the record also holds the rebuttal. After the fall of Saigon, the United States resettled more than 1.2 million Southeast Asians, the largest such effort in its history and one of its great integration successes, proving that scale was never the obstacle and political will always was. The failures are not mysteries; they recur by design, and so do the fixes. This ledger draws them into a single standard, the Global Alliance Principles, operationalized through Local Staff International's Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions, that governments should adopt before the next war rather than after the next collapse.

The Unfinished Mission: The International and Historical Context

Every nation that fights a war abroad relies on local people to do it, the interpreters, drivers, guards, fixers, and partners without whom no foreign mission functions. And every nation, sooner or later, faces the same question when the war ends: what does it owe the people who took its side? This report is a ledger of how that question has been answered, across the current Afghan Mission Partners and across half a century of precedent, from the most successful resettlement in American history to one of the darkest abandonments in modern memory.

It is a companion to "The Unfinished Mission," which documented the American record in detail. This piece widens the lens to the rest of the coalition and to the historical record. The United States and its allies have faced this choice before; the outcomes are documented, and the pattern is clear. The same failures recur across countries and decades as do the rare successes. That consistency points to design and political will as the decisive factors that can be codified. The record supports a single, shared standard: the Global Alliance Principles, operationalized through the *Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions* published by Local Staff International and the University of York, and adopted by governments before the next war, rather than improvised after the next collapse.

The case for the Global Alliance Principles and Guidelines for the Rights & Protection of Local Staff in International Missions

The Global Alliance Principles, endorsed by organizations across the globe, seeks to break our patterns of abandonment and learn from the historical record by proposing a standard that governments and other stakeholders can adopt. They rest on a single premise that the historical evidence strongly supports: a mission is finished when commitments to Mission Partners are fulfilled. They define a Mission Partner broadly, as a wartime ally, a locally employed staff member, or another conflict-afflicted partner, precisely the category this ledger shows has fallen through the cracks of existing legal frameworks and interpreter-only programs.

Five principles follow, and each points to a practical standard governments can adopt to protect local Mission Partners more consistently and effectively.

1. Finish the mission. Governments should resume and complete resettlement for everyone already deemed eligible, approved, or placed into a pathway, including people stranded in third countries, cases paused or withdrawn, and families separated by arbitrary cutoffs. This would help bring the 2024 and 2025 haphazard suspensions of resettlement programmes to an orderly close by moving vetted, approved people in mid-process across the coalition.

2. Restore and protect legal pathways, with clear and durable rules. Governments should safeguard approved cases, avoid retroactive rule changes, maintain transparent eligibility standards, and ensure any return or reintegration decisions are genuinely voluntary and safe. This responds to the closures, revocations, and return incentives documented in the ledger by pointing to a more stable approach: pathways that people and governments can rely on start to finish.

3. Guarantee safe status, work authorization, and family reunification. Every resettled local Mission Partner should receive immediate lawful status, the right to work, a clear path to residency or citizenship, and the ability to reunite with immediate family. Durable status supports stability, integration, and family unity, and gives resettled partners the legal footing they need to rebuild their lives after arrival.

4. Establish binding "never again" standards for future missions. Governments should adopt binding minimum standards that build partner protection into mission planning from the start, as outlined in the Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions. Those standards should include early identification of people at risk, secure preservation of employment and service records, compensation protocols for injury or death, funded evacuation contingencies, and coordination among allies so that people who take comparable risks receive comparable protection. Together, the Global Alliance Principles and the LSI Guidelines offer a practical framework for this work before, during, and after a mission.

5. Create permanent accountability and oversight. States, organisations, and private

contractors may hold primary, derived (indirect), and/or shared responsibilities in relation to the protection, rights, and duty of care owed to local staff, depending on the nature of the relationship and the risks created. While responsibility may be distributed among multiple actors, it must never be eliminated, diluted, or obscured through contracting/outsourcing, partnership, or mission structures.

Independent, enduring oversight, public reporting on commitments and progress, and clear accountability measures give governments the tools to sustain commitments, track progress, and adjust quickly when implementation needs support. This turns "never again" into an operational standard: one that courts, inspectors, parliaments, and the public can adopt and use to reinforce commitments and keep protection on course.

These principles set the standard. The operational detail for meeting it is set out in Local Staff International's (LSI) 2026 ***Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions***, developed through a consultative process involving practitioners, researchers, veterans, individuals with lived experience, and humanitarian organisations across multiple countries. These Guidelines set out a unified framework of guiding principles and binding minimum standards. Together, they integrate ethical commitments with operational requirements to guide how states, organisations, and partners engage with, protect, and support local staff throughout all phases of service. In practical terms, the LSI guidelines carry the Global Alliance Principles through the full life of a mission: recruitment and recordkeeping before deployment, duty of care during service, and relocation and reintegration afterward. The Guidelines consist of Guiding Principles (see image below), which articulate the core commitments and ethical foundations underpinning responsible engagement, and Minimum Standards, which translate each Principle into concrete, actionable minimum requirements.

PRE-MISSION ENGAGEMENT	PROTECTION & SUPPORT DURING ENGAGEMENT	AFTERCARE - TRANSITION, POST TRANSITION & REINTEGRATION	CRISES RESPONSE, EVACUATION & CONTINUITY OF DUTY-OF-CARE
1. Take Responsibility from the Outset 2. Assess Demand and Anticipate Impact 3. Coordinate and Harmonise Employment Conditions 4. Clarify Employers' Duties and Accountability 5. Train International Staff Before Deployment 6. Recruit and Vet Transparently 7. Secure Informed Consent 8. Ensure Full Legal Compliance 9. Plan for Worst-Case Scenarios	1. Guarantee Equal Protection for All 2. Train Everyone to Protect Themselves and Others 3. Prioritise Safety First 4. Assess Threats and Strengthen Accountability 5. Ensure Fair Pay and Sustained Benefits 6. Prioritise Mental Health and Trauma Risk Management 7. Prepare for Injury, Illness, and Death 8. Extend Protection to Families 9. Safeguard Data to Protect People	1. Plan the End from the Beginning 2. Ensure Fair and Transparent Redundancy Procedures 3. Guarantee Continuity of Pay and Benefits 4. Conduct Individual Risk Assessments 5. Facilitate Exit Briefings 6. Ensure Access to Legal Advice and Complaint Mechanisms 7. Support Economic and Professional Reintegration 8. Provide Psychosocial and Integration Aftercare 9. Secure Employment and Personnel Records	1. Prepare Before the Crisis 2. Uphold Duty of Care Without Exception 3. Maintain Robust Documentation and Verification Systems 4. Protect Families Alongside Staff 5. Communicate Clearly and Transparently 6. Build Logistics Networks Across Partners 7. Strengthen Interoperability 8. Provide Safe and Legal Pathways to Protection 9. Ensure No One Is Left Behind

Local Staff International, Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions (2026).

Together, the Principles and the Guidelines provide the planned, durable, and enforceable commitment this ledger argues governments should adopt before the next mission begins.

Adopting the Global Alliance Principles and putting the LSI Guidelines into practice is a strategic investment in mission readiness, trusted partnership, force protection, national security and international integrity. Governments that rely on local partners in war have a direct interest in being known as reliable allies, because the next generation of interpreters, guides, fixers and local staff will look to this record when deciding whether to serve. The historical record shows that durable, well-planned protection can deliver lasting national benefits: Vietnam, undertaken at scale and against deeper public opposition, became one of the most successful integration stories in American history. The Global Alliance Principles and LSI Guidelines offer governments a practical way to carry those lessons forward, align allies around shared standards and build protection into future missions from the start.

The Implications of the Failure to Protect

Allied responses fell into two broad models. The first was a standing program: a named pathway with published eligibility criteria. The United States Special Immigrant Visa program (SIV), the United Kingdom's Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS), Canada's Special Immigration Measures, Australia's Locally Engaged Employee program, Germany's discretionary §22 local-staff scheme and Federal Admission Program, and the Personnel Civil de Recrutement Local (PCRL) scheme in France all fit this model. They created expectations, generated paper trails, and gave courts a (albeit often limited) basis for enforcement. Standing programmes - despite some of their design flaws - represent a proactive approach and reflect some anticipation of the risks faced by war time allies during and post-engagement.

The second was an ad hoc evacuation: a one-time August 2021 airlift later absorbed into national asylum systems, without a durable pathway behind it. Spain's Operation Antígona, Czechia's classified extraction, Italy's Operation Aquila Omnia, and the Norwegian efforts followed this approach. They moved people quickly, and largely stopped, leaving those absent from 2021 manifests without a dedicated route.

Despite differences, both models converge in having failed to offer protection to local staff on a comprehensive and equitable basis. By 2025 and into 2026, every program had closed intake, frozen processing, or been formally terminated. Standing programs were dismantled by policy; ad hoc efforts ended without replacement. Not only were local war allies left behind, our own military and civilian personnel suffered moral injury as a result of this unfinished mission. Future national security and mission integrity is likely to be jeopardised by our past failures to protect our local assets.

The country ledger: International Context




Figure 2. Afghans brought to safety since 2021, by coalition country. Counts differ across countries (issued, certified, arrived, resettled); see the methodology note.

United States

The oldest and only statutory program, established in 2009 under the Afghan Allies Protection Act. Roughly 160,000 SIVs had been issued through January 31, 2026, according to the State Department's most recent report to Congress. Of the 50,500 visa numbers Congress authorized for principal applicants, 44,530 had been used and only about 5,970 remained as of December 31, 2025. Intake for new Chief of Mission applications closed on that same date. Entry was suspended on January 1, 2026 under Presidential Proclamation 10998, which removed the prior exemption for SIV holders. A federal court ordered Chief of Mission processing to resume on February 6, 2026 in *Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Rubio*. As of mid-2025, 178,110 Afghans held Chief of Mission approval, the U.S. government's determination that they qualify for the program, the great majority still awaiting an interview or a visa. Status on arrival is lawful permanent residence, the strongest grant in the alliance, though the parallel parolee population received only temporary status.

Canada

A three-stream effort, the Special Immigration Measures Program for Afghan nationals (and their families) who assisted the Government of Canada plus the Special humanitarian program focused on resettling vulnerable Afghans and Pathway to permanent residence for extended family members of former interpreters. Canada committed to 40,000 and by March 2026 has welcomed more than 63,000 Afghans, one of the heaviest per-capita lifts in the alliance. All

intake is closed. Canada's burden-of-proof problem is older and well documented: under its 2009 Kandahar interpreter program, roughly two of every three applicants were turned away for failing to prove they faced extraordinary, individualized risk, a pattern that foreshadowed the same design flaw across the coalition.

United Kingdom

Three routes, ARAP, ACRS, and the secret Afghanistan Response Route, were consolidated under the Afghan Resettlement Programme; each route gives the applicant indefinite leave to remain. About 38,617 Afghans had been resettled under these Schemes by the 31st of March 2026, according to the UK Government's own Immigration System Statistics. All routes closed to new principal applicants on July 1, 2025, with around 17,000 outstanding applications in April 2026. The defining feature is the 2022 Ministry of Defence data breach, a spreadsheet containing about 33,000 entries, which exposed applicants to Taliban reprisal, triggered the first "contra mundum" superinjunction the British government has ever obtained, and drove the program's projected cost to a central estimate near £5.7 billion, with the National Audit Office stating that the exact figure cannot be determined. Early eligibility for ARAP was interpreter-narrow and excluded subcontracted staff, which was only corrected after substantial civil society and media pressure on behalf of embassy and special-forces interpreters in the lead up to August 2021.

Germany

A local-staff (Ortskräfte) scheme since 2013 and a Federal Admission Program launched in October 2022. Germany informed about 45,000 Afghans they would be admitted and moved more than 33,000 by 2024. The Merz government froze all but the legally binding local-staff track in May 2025, moved to terminate two further tracks affecting roughly 640 people in December 2025, and offered cash payments, from €2,500 before departure up to €10,000 after, to those who would abandon their claims; by January 2026 only 167 Afghan nationals stuck in Pakistan accepted cash as an alternative offer for resettlement, over 350 people have rejected the offer, with over 130 Afghans still deciding what to do. Their futures remain in limbo. The courts are split. In August 2025 the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg ruled the older admission pledges were non-binding political decisions the government could withdraw at will, but in December 2025 the Federal Constitutional Court ordered the government to issue visas without delay to the family of a former Afghan supreme court judge. Where the American judiciary has been decisive, the German judiciary is contested.

Australia

The Locally Engaged Employee program, run across the Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Police portfolios since 2012, plus 26,500 dedicated humanitarian places across 2025 and 2026.

New certification closed in November 2023 and the program wound up by mid-2024. The structural flaw is a two-step design in which certification is not a visa, forcing a separate humanitarian application and stranding people in the gap. In August 2021 Australia backflipped on its decision to deny visas to more than 100 former security guards who worked at the Australian embassy in Kabul as contractors rather than direct employees. About 3,267 people reached Australia through the LEE track, while the broader humanitarian stream granted 13,612 visas to Afghans between August 2021 and August 2023. The independent Thom Review, led by Dr. Vivienne Thom and reported in June 2023, documented the program's failures.

Netherlands

A narrowly defined procedure for interpreters and high-risk workers excluded most locally employed staff, until a political parliamentary motion in August 2021 forced the Government to accept responsibility for a larger group of local staff, including Provincial Reconstruction Team guards, fixers and NGO staff on Dutch-funded projects. Between 15 to 26 August 2021, 1,860 Afghan employees and family members were evacuated, including those who fell under the parliamentary motion, interpreters and high-profile defence and police mission personnel, local staff from the Dutch Embassy and 49 local staff from international organisations (EU, UN, NATO). In July 2026, the total tally of Afghan evacuees reached 4,600 with the Government still committing to resettle persons who are eligible under a Special Provision. Dutch courts ruled repeatedly that rejection emails were appealable formal decisions. A new cabinet cancelled the plan to protect Afghan embassy guards in 2024; when a lower court ordered 42 of them to be brought to safety, The Hague court of appeal overturned that ruling in November 2025, holding that the state was not obliged to evacuate them. With a High Court ruling on an appeal by 42 Embassy Guards currently pending, judicial contestation is the throughline. New legislation passed on 26 May 2026 means that those evacuated in August 2021 no longer have access to a permanent residence permit, and can only request a 3-year temporary residence permit.

France

The PCRL scheme for locally employed civilians, covering roughly 1,000 staff. France repatriated 171 former employees with their families between 2013 and 2015, about 550 people, and another 51 with their families in 2018 and 2019, about 218 people. A total of 224 interpreters received visas across three waves through 2018, with many who came through the asylum route refused until the Conseil d'État, France's highest administrative court, ruled in 2018 for 6 rejected applicants that they should be granted 'Functional Protection' by granting visas to former interpreters previously turned away. In 2019, the Council of State decided to extend this to all interpreters who had previously been rejected. France's record also stands out for its early commencement of evacuation (between March and July 2021, 624 Afghans, mostly Embassy staff and staff of French secondary schools in Afghanistan were evacuated), despite initially having to be forced into protection duties through the courts. During the evacuation Operation Apagan in August 2021, around 2,600 Afghans were evacuated, while an additional

396 Afghans were evacuated between September and December 2021. However, a 2023 investigative report revealed that a French-led intelligence cell in Afghanistan was kept secret for years that the French Government left its local agents behind.

The rest of the coalition

Several coalition members ran no standing program and relied on one-time airlifts and their national asylum systems. Spain's Operation Antígona evacuated about 3,900 collaborators over the year after August 2021, and across three operations 942 people obtained international protection; Madrid's Torrejón air base served as the European Union's processing hub, and protection ran entirely through asylum. Czechia had suspended an earlier Afghan-interpreter pathway in 2017, and only sustained pressure from the #SaveTheInterpreters campaign, backed by civil-society groups and veterans, forced the issue back onto the agenda; the classified program approved on 30 July 2021 was initially narrow, and long-serving former interpreters whose contracts had ended were excluded until continued campaigning added some in the final days. Three Czech military flights ultimately evacuated 195 people, including 170 Afghan nationals, after which the government rejected a broader commitment and claimed everyone designated had been brought out, obscuring how narrow and shifting the criteria were.

Italy's Operation Aquila Omnia transferred 5,011 people, including 4,890 Afghans, on 87 flights between August 13 and 31, 2021, one of the largest European military airlifts of the evacuation. Norway brought roughly 1,100 people out. Sweden processed some of its embassy's Afghan staff, former ISAF local employees, and human-rights defenders within its 2021 refugee quota, but until today around 50 Afghan former employees remain stranded in Afghanistan. In 2025, a man who previously worked as guard chief for the Swedish ISAF force in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007 was murdered by the Taliban. In August 2021, Denmark evacuated just over 900 Afghans linked to Danish or UN, the EU and other international organizations. However, it took until November 2021 for a special law to be introduced to define their legal status; they would only get 2 years of residence without the possibility of extension, putting this group at a disadvantage compared to "ordinary" asylum seekers, both in terms of rights and future prospects. Finland had no dedicated programme in place, and only evacuated a few hundred Afghans during the evacuation window in August 2021. The Finnish approach was criticised for its reactive rather than proactive approach, its arbitrary eligibility criteria and its exclusion of former embassy security personnel who guarded the mission area. Estonia committed to evacuating up to 30 Afghan local staff who worked for the Estonian Government, the EU or NATO, while Belgium ran interpreter and humanitarian-visa tracks, criticized for narrow eligibility and a high burden of proof. At the collective level, fifteen EU member states pledged 40,000 resettlement places at a December 2021 forum, to be delivered over the following year. Outside the coalition entirely, Brazil issued humanitarian visas through its regional embassies, 11,122 of them granted of 12,966 authorized by November 2023.

The longer record: Historical Context

The Afghan case is not the first time a Western power has owed safety to people who served it in war, and the historical outcomes are the most useful evidence available. They run from the most successful resettlement in American history to one of the darkest abandonments in modern memory, and the pattern is centuries old. The cases below stretch from the Assyrian Levies of 1933 to the Ukrainians of 2022, and the same lesson repeats in each.

A Century of Choices: Promises Kept and Broken, 1933-2023




Figure 3. A century of choices: promises kept and broken, 1933 to 2023. The classification is AfghanEvac's editorial judgment; see the text for each case.

The Assyrian Levies, Iraq, 1933

The earliest well-documented case in this ledger, and the proof that the pattern is a century old. Beginning around 1919, Britain raised the Assyrian Levies from Iraq's Assyrian Christian minority to guard its assets, above all Royal Air Force bases, during and after the British Mandate. The Assyrians were prized as disciplined and loyal, and were used to put down revolts elsewhere in Iraq. As Britain drew toward Iraqi independence in 1932, their protector withdrew and their position collapsed. In August 1933 the Iraqi army, led by the Kurdish general Bakr Sidqi, attacked Assyrian villages in and around the town of Simele, striking roughly fifty-four villages over several days. British official accounts put the dead at about 600; Assyrian sources put the toll at 3,000 to 6,000. Either way, thousands fled into Syria, and a community that had served the British faithfully was left to a massacre once its usefulness ended.

Filipino veterans of World War II

The clearest proof that even the United States has broken faith outright, and by statute. After President Roosevelt ordered the Commonwealth Army of the Philippines into U.S. service in July 1941, more than 250,000 Filipinos fought under American command in the Second World

War, promised the benefits owed to American veterans. On February 18, 1946, the Rescission Act declared that their service "shall not be deemed to have been service in the military or naval forces of the United States," stripping those benefits at a stroke; of the many nations allied with the United States in the war, Filipinos were the only group singled out for denial. The debt was paid only in part and only after most of the men were gone: the 2009 Filipino Veterans Equity Compensation Fund made a one-time payment of \ \$15,000 to eligible veterans in the United States and \ \$9,000 to those in the Philippines, and in 2016 Congress awarded the survivors its Gold Medal, seventy years late. It is a reminder that a promise to a wartime ally can be revoked by an act of Congress as easily as by a proclamation.

The Moluccans, Indonesia, 1951

The evidence that historical betrayal of local auxiliaries casts its shadows over generations. As recently as the 21st of June 2026, Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten issued a formal state apology to Moluccans (an indigenous Melanesian-Austronesian ethnic group native to the Maluku Islands in Indonesia), who served the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) during the Indonesian independence war, and their family members and descendants.

In 1951, following Indonesia's independence in late 1949, the 3,500 Moluccan soldiers from the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) who were considered traitors by the Indonesian state, were evacuated to the Netherlands, accompanied by about 9000 family members. The Dutch Government promised that their exile was temporary and that they would negotiate Molucca's independence from Indonesia, so that once this was achieved, the Moluccans would return there. Upon disembarking, the Moluccan allies were humiliated by being discharged from the army, initially banned from work and housed in former Nazi concentration camps at Westerbork, Vught and elsewhere in the Dutch countryside.

Following their decades long struggle for rights and recognition, the Dutch Prime Minister finally apologised to the estimated 70,000 Moluccans now living in the Netherlands: *"For the heartless and dishonorable discharge from military service. For the inadequate support and housing. For going unseen and being abandoned. For the unfulfilled longing for home. For the sorrow and pain in so many Moluccan families [translated from Dutch]"* This underlines that resettlement should be followed by secure legal status, right to work, dignity and recognition and that the denial of this does not only affect mission partners but has an enduring effect on their descendants.

The Harkis, Algeria, 1962

The starkest abandonment in the modern record, and the clearest warning of what a broken promise costs. As many as 200,000 to 260,000 Algerian Muslims served France as auxiliaries and soldiers during the Algerian war of independence. The Évian Accords that ended the war on March 18, 1962 contained no effective protection for them, and on March 19, 1962 the minister for Algerian affairs, Louis Joxe, ordered that French officers' efforts to transfer Harkis to France

cease, directing that those who reached metropolitan France outside the official plan be sent back. Estimates of those killed in reprisals after independence range widely and remain contested, from about 30,000 to as many as 150,000, often with extreme cruelty and often alongside their families. Roughly 90,000 reached France anyway, many because individual officers disobeyed their orders, only to be interned for years in squalid camps. France did not formally acknowledge its responsibility until decades later, through apologies by Jacques Chirac in 2001, François Hollande in 2012, and finally Emmanuel Macron in 2021, followed by a reparations law in 2022. The Harki case is the moral floor of this entire subject. It is what "we will not leave them behind" exists to prevent. This stain on France's record haunts till today. In the lead up to the withdrawal from Afghanistan, French media referred to Afghan mission partners as 'Les harkis de Kaboul' [the harkis of Kabul].

Vietnam and Indochina, 1975 onward

The defining proof that large-scale ally resettlement works and is demanded by our forces on the ground. The famous words of Frank Snepp, CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam, about the evacuation from Saigon are echoed in current calls by Afghanistan veterans: "It is not too much to say that in terms of [...] the betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators, our handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace". After the fall of Saigon, a Republican president, Gerald Ford, signed the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act on May 23, 1975 over public opposition, with only 36 percent of Americans in favor in a Gallup poll that spring, and the United States admitted more than 130,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian refugees that year, many of whom had worked directly with American forces. The effort did not stop there. Through the Refugee Parole Program and the Orderly Departure Program, about 750,000 were resettled by 1986, and the cumulative total reached more than 1.2 million Southeast Asian refugees resettled in the United States by 2008, the largest resettlement effort in American history. The crisis produced the Refugee Act of 1980, which created the modern U.S. resettlement system, and the later Amerasian Homecoming Act brought roughly 25,000 Amerasian children and, with their families, more than 80,000 people in all. The integration record is the rebuttal to every contemporary fear: Vietnamese Americans now naturalize at about 78 percent, the highest rate of any major immigrant-origin group, and own homes at roughly 68 percent, according to Pew Research Center. The lesson is unambiguous. Scale was never the obstacle. Political will was.

There is a second lesson in Vietnam, less often told. The crisis did not just resettle people; it built an institution. The Refugee Act of 1980, passed in its wake, created the standing U.S. refugee and asylum system on which every later ally program has relied, the durable backbone that an ad hoc airlift lacks. And the objection that mass protection cannot be done quickly is answered twice over. The United States moved more than 130,000 people in a matter of months in 1975, and, as the Ukraine case below shows, the European Union extended protection to more than four million people within days in 2022. Half a century apart, both prove the same thing: rapid, large-scale protection is a matter of political decision, not logistical capacity.

The Montagnards of Vietnam

The Montagnards, the indigenous highland peoples of Vietnam's Central Highlands who call themselves Degar, were among the most devoted allies American forces ever had, and among the most completely abandoned. From 1961, U.S. Army Special Forces recruited and trained them in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, and the bond between the Green Berets and the highlanders became legendary. By late 1963, some 43,000 Montagnards defended the area around the first camp at Buon Enao, with thousands more in mobile strike forces. When Saigon fell in 1975 they were left behind, and the new government treated them as enemies, with imprisonment, land seizure, and religious persecution that continued for decades and erupted again in the Central Highlands protests of 2001 and 2004, which were met with mass arrests and lethal force. What rescue came, came not from a program but from the soldiers who had served alongside them. Former Special Forces members founded Save the Montagnard People in 1986 and spent years extracting their old comrades: about 200 were resettled in North Carolina that year, roughly 400 were found by United Nations forces in Cambodia in 1992, and some 900 more came after the 2001 crackdown. North Carolina is now home to the largest Montagnard community in the world outside Vietnam, more than 12,000 people, most of them around Greensboro. One Montagnard veteran, describing the years of waiting in the jungle for Americans who never came back, said simply, "We thought they would come back for us." Some Americans did. Their government did not.

The Hmong of Laos

The companion story to the Montagnards, and the same lesson. In the CIA's "Secret War" in Laos from 1961, a Hmong guerrilla army under General Vang Pao fought the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. Hmong strength approached 40,000 by 1969, and an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Hmong soldiers were killed, a staggering toll for so small a people. When the United States withdrew and the Pathet Lao took power in 1975, the Hmong faced reprisals for that service; more than 100,000 fled to camps in Thailand, and a final group of over 15,000 was resettled from the Wat Tham Krabok camp as late as 2004 and 2005. Today the United States is home to roughly 360,000 Hmong, concentrated in California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The resettlement was real and substantial, but it arrived in waves across thirty years, driven as much by advocates and veterans as by any standing commitment, the improvised, after-the-fact pattern this report argues against.

The Kurds, Iraq, 1991

A different model worth understanding, protection in place rather than relocation. After the United States encouraged Iraqis to rise against Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War and then did not back the uprising, his forces crushed it and more than a million Kurds fled toward Iran and Turkey, with thousands dying in the mountains. The coalition response, Operation Provide Comfort, begun on April 6, 1991, was not resettlement but a no-fly zone and a protected safe haven in northern Iraq that let most refugees return home and ultimately enabled Kurdish

autonomy after Iraqi forces withdrew that October. It is a reminder that relocation is not the only tool, that a safe zone can work when there is will to enforce it, and equally that protection contingent on a foreign military presence is fragile, since the guarantees thin as soon as the strategic interest does.

Former Yugoslavia, 1995

Srebrenica is the clearest proof that a government's duty to its local staff reaches their families, and that justice, when it comes, often comes only through the courts and only after decades. For readers less familiar with it, Srebrenica was the worst atrocity in Europe since the Second World War: during the Bosnian war, a Dutch United Nations battalion, Dutchbat, was assigned to protect the "safe area" of Srebrenica, and when Bosnian Serb forces overran it in July 1995 they massacred more than seven thousand Bosnian Muslim men and boys. Hasan Nuhanović, a UN interpreter who held a pass and was on the evacuation list, watched Dutchbat command expel his father and brother from the compound; both were killed. Dutch courts first dismissed the families' claims on the ground that Dutchbat served under UN command. But in 2011 the Court of Appeal, later affirmed by the Supreme Court, held the Netherlands liable anyway, finding that the state exercised effective control over the compound and could not shed its human-rights obligations by pointing to the UN. The lesson for every nation that serves under an alliance or an international mandate is that shared command does not dissolve the duty of care it owes the people who worked for it, or their families.

Iraq, 2007 onward

The direct statutory sibling of the Afghan program, and proof that the United States already ran this exact playbook and produced the same failures. The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007, enacted within the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act and signed by President George W. Bush on January 28, 2008, created a temporary Iraqi SIV program of 5,000 visas a year for five years alongside a Priority 2 Direct Access refugee pathway for U.S.-affiliated Iraqis. About 47,575 Iraqis were resettled through Direct Access, but the program suffered the same chronic backlogs as the Afghan SIV, and in early 2021 the State Department suspended Direct Access after a Justice Department prosecution exposed a ring that bribed U.S. employees to steal refugee-processing records, the same species of security-and-data panic now used to justify Afghan suspensions. The program reopened in March 2022. The Iraqi precedent forecloses the argument that the Afghan collapse is novel or unforeseeable. Congress built this mechanism once, watched it stall, and built it again.

Mali, 2023

A case that activated renewed concerns about the lack of a protection framework for locally engaged staff. In November 2023, the German association of interpreters and translators published a statement entitled 'No second Kabul: Germany must guarantee the security of local staff in Mali', following earlier statements of concern by local mission partners and German

stakeholders. At that time, around 59 local staff supported the German Army, 16 were employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and around 300 for the state-led GIZ (German Agency for International Cooperation). While the date of the withdrawal of the German army was approaching, there was no plan in place in case local staff needed to be granted protection. Terrorists threatened to persecute local staff of international organisations and local staff themselves wrote letters to beg for guarantees for protection; a déjà-vu?

Echoes across the century

Other cases run through the same hundred years, as well as through the earlier colonial era: the Karen and Kachin hill peoples who fought alongside Allied forces against Japan in Burma and were then left to the Burmese state, and Britain's long and litigated reckoning with the Gurkhas, who served the Crown for two centuries before winning, only in 2009 and only after a public campaign, the right to settle in the country they had defended. Across every one of these cases, the same variables decided the outcome. Where there was statutory durability, sustained political will, and a readiness to act at scale, as in Vietnam, the result was both humane and a long-term national asset. Where protection rested on revocable promises or was actively withheld, as with the Harkis, the result was slaughter and a stain that took generations to acknowledge. The Afghan case sits between these poles, and which way it resolves is still being decided.

Cross-cutting design lessons

Eligibility should reflect how missions actually operate. Nearly every program began with a narrow focus on interpreters and left other categories of local support less clearly protected, including subcontractors, cooks, drivers, guards, and NGO staff. The United Kingdom's early treatment of subcontracted embassy and Special Forces interpreters, the Netherlands' initially narrow interpreter focus, and similar patterns elsewhere show why future systems need broader definitions from the start. Eligibility should be based on the risk created by service, not on the formal job title or contract structure.

Proof requirements should account for conflict conditions. Programs that put the onus of proof on the applicant, demanding extensive documentation or individualized threat evidence, generated high rejection rates and vetting timelines built for routine migration rather than for people who served a mission and then had to flee it. The design presumed safety and forced the endangered to disprove it. The burden fell heaviest, and slowest, on those whose service was administered by one government but adjudicated by another, as with the Danish interpreters who served under British command in Helmand and had no direct employer record to point to, so their cases depended on a second government's archives and cooperation. The contrast with what works is instructive. Where a government holds its own employment records, verification can move quickly, as the United Kingdom's Labour Support Unit showed in easing the administration of the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy. A stronger model would start from the risk created by service, allow flexible proof where records are incomplete or unsafe to obtain, and rely on robust government-held data systems wherever possible.

Reviewable pathways make commitments more durable. Courts appeared repeatedly across the record because legal pathways created decisions that could be reviewed. France, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States all saw litigation shape implementation, clarify obligations, or reopen contested decisions. The lesson is that pathways grounded in law, published criteria, clear records, and reviewable decision-making are more durable than discretionary pledges or one-time evacuations. The record also shows that legal review works best when responsibilities are defined clearly at the outset, so courts, inspectors, parliaments, and governments have a shared basis for keeping implementation on course.

Durable status supports protection and integration. While many programs granted permanent residence, historical cases as well as the current Afghan parolee population in the United States and several European Afghan cohorts received only temporary or contingent status. Protection is strongest when lawful status, work authorization, family reunification, and a clear path to permanent residence or citizenship are built into the pathway from the start.

Coalition commitments need coordinated follow-through. Closures and freezes clustered across 2024 and 2025, at the same time that Afghans sheltering in third countries faced growing risk from deportation campaigns and deteriorating protection space. Seen together, these timelines show why allied governments need a shared approach to tracking

commitments, coordinating case movement, and maintaining safe pathways until approved and eligible people have reached durable protection.

The historical record shows what durable protection requires. The patterns in Afghanistan are not new. Narrow eligibility, document-heavy proof, reliance on courts, temporary status, and emergency planning after collapse recur from Algeria in 1962 to Iraq in 2007 to Afghanistan today. The same record also shows what works: early commitments, lawful and reviewable pathways, inclusive eligibility, secure records, family unity, durable status, and readiness to act at scale. Those lessons can now be built into standing systems before the next mission begins.

What the record teaches

Across every case in this ledger, outcomes turned on three design choices: whether commitments were durable, whether governments sustained political will, and whether systems were ready to act at scale. When those elements were in place, as in the United States after Vietnam, protection became both a humanitarian achievement and a long-term national asset. When they were absent or left to improvisation, the costs were borne by mission partners, their families, service members, and the credibility of future missions. Governments and stakeholders now sit at the same decision point in terms of whether to close existing commitments narrowly, or use this record to build a more reliable model for the next mission. Three structural lessons follow:

The first is that durable solutions matter.

Across countries, pathways grounded in law, with clear and published eligibility, clear records and reviewable decision-making proved more resilient than discretionary pledges or one-time evacuations, even where those legal pathways still faced backlogs or design limits.

The second is that recurring implementation challenges can be anticipated.

Narrow eligibility, document-heavy proof requirements, temporary status, and emergency planning after a collapse are familiar patterns across the record. They can be addressed in advance through broader definitions, secure record systems, clear family and status protections, funded contingency planning and coordinated oversight.

A third lesson concerns the design of the pathway itself. Many governments relied on immigrant- or work-visa systems built for orderly peacetime migration: document-heavy, sequential and premised on applicants who can safely gather records. Those tools can work where governments hold complete employment records, but they are poorly matched to contractors, fixers, and locally employed staff, and other mission partners whose proof may be dispersed, inaccessible, or destroyed in conflict. A better model starts from the risk created by service, not only the paperwork available afterward. Properly designed, a protection-based pathway can recognize that risk, account for missing records when missions collapse, and provide durable status upon arrival.

The record is therefore not only a warning. It is a roadmap. Governments already know the conditions that make protection work: commitments made early, pathways grounded in law, eligibility that reflects how missions actually operate, risk assessment informed by military, humanitarian and security realities on the ground, secure stewardship of service records, family unity, durable status, and oversight that keeps implementation on course. The practical task now is to turn the lessons into standing systems before the next mission begins.

What you can do

The record in this ledger is a warning, but it is also a roadmap, and the next chapter is not yet written. Three things move it forward, and every reader can do at least one.

- First, endorse the recommendations in *The Unfinished Mission*, the concrete steps the United States can take now to keep faith with its Afghan allies.
- Second, sign on in support of Local Staff International's *Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions*, the operational standard that turns "never again" into practice.
- Third, and simplest, use whatever microphone you have. Raise this with your legislature, your ministry, your press, your veterans, your colleagues, and your community, because governments change course when the people they answer to refuse to let the question be forgotten.

Governments, legislators, and institutions ready to act can start now: adopt the Global Alliance Principles, endorse the LSI Guidelines, and commit to reviewing existing pathways against these standards before the next mission begins, not after the next collapse.

Methodology and sourcing

The figures in this companion are drawn from the sources listed below. They carry differing reporting dates and count different things, principal applicants versus derivatives, certified versus arrived, intake versus issuance, and where that distinction matters the text says so. They are suitable for framing and for press and congressional use; any single figure cited externally should be quoted with the date and source attached, as it is here. A handful of figures remain genuinely contested in the underlying record, notably the Harki death toll and the precise size of small classified extractions, and those are presented as ranges rather than point estimates.

Sources

United States

- U.S. Department of State, *An Update to the Status of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program* (Sec. 7019(e) report to Congress, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Report-An-Update-to-the-Status-of-the-Afghan-Special-Immigrant-Visa-Program-007276-HRC1390.pdf>.
- Presidential Proclamation 10998, Federal Register (Dec. 19, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/19/2025-23570>.
- *Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Rubio*, No. 1:18-cv-01388 (D.D.C.), via International Refugee Assistance Project, <https://refugeerights.org/news-resources>.
- U.S. Department of State, Afghan SIV program pages, <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/special-immig-visa-afghans-employed-us-gov.html>.

United Kingdom

- GOV.UK, Afghan Resettlement Programme, <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/afghan-resettlement-programme>.
- Transparency data - Afghan Resettlement Programme: operational data (21 May 2026), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/afghan-resettlement-programme-operational-data/afghan-resettlement-programme-operational-data>
- National Audit Office, statement on the cost of the Afghan data breach and resettlement scheme, <https://www.nao.org.uk/press-releases/mod-does-not-know-exact-cost-to-date-of-afghan-data-breach-resettlement-scheme/>.
- House of Commons Defence Committee, *Lost in Translation?* (2018), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/572/57207.htm>.

Canada

- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Special Immigration Measures Program for Afghan nationals (and their families) who assisted the Government of Canada.
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/afghanistan/special-measures/immigration-program.html>
- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. (October 30, 2023) *Canada meets commitment to welcome 40,000 vulnerable Afghans*.
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/10/canada-meets-commitment-to-welcome-40000-vulnerable-afghans.html>
- The Canadian Press. (2011, September 12). *Canada rejects majority of Afghan interpreters' refugee claims*. CBC News.
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-rejects-majority-of-afghan-interpreters-refugee-claims-1.1059850>
- <https://www.cbc.ca/news/immigration-afghanistan-canada-interpreter-1.6739081>

Australia

- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Afghan Locally Engaged Employee program,
<https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/afghanistan/afghan-locally-engaged-employee-program-lee>.
- Minister for Defence, Independent (Thom) Review release (June 2023),
<https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-06-01/independent-review-in-to-afghan-locally-engaged-employee-program>.
- Parliament of Australia, Afghanistan engagement inquiry,
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Afghanistanengagement.
- SBS, Australia grants visas for former Kabul embassy guards a day after rejecting them (Aug 22, 2021),
<https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australia-grants-visas-for-former-kabul-embassy-guards-a-day-after-rejecting-them/edfq2b5mo>

Germany

- Federal Foreign Office, Bundesaufnahmeprogramm Afghanistan,
<https://www.bundesaufnahmeprogrammafghanistan.de/bundesaufnahme-en>.
- Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte, admission-program litigation,
<https://freiheitsrechte.org/en/aufnahmeprogramm>.
- InfoMigrants, Most Afghans in Pakistan reject German cash offer in lieu of resettlement (Jan. 2026),
<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/69417/most-afghans-in-pakistan-reject-german-cash-offer-in-lieu-of-resettlement>.

- Al Jazeera, German cash-payment offer (Nov. 6, 2025),
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/6/germany-offers-vulnerable-afghans-cash-to-cess-immigration-efforts>.

France

- Sénat, written question response on PCRL repatriations (June 10, 2021),
<https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2021/qSEQ21061892G.html>.
- Conseil d'État, decision n° 421694 (Feb. 1, 2019),
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ceta/id/CETATEXT000038088246>.
- France 24, French interpreters' asylum ruling (Feb. 13, 2019),
<https://www.france24.com/en/20190213-french-victory-ends-long-asylum-battle-afghan-interpreters>.
- InfoMigrants, First flights of Afghan evacuees land in Paris (Aug. 20, 2021),
<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/34469/first-flights-of-afghan-evacuees-land-in-paris>
- France24, France, UK end civilian evacuations from Afghanistan (Aug. 28, 2021),
<https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210828-france-ends-its-evacuations-from-afghanistan-britain-announces-last-day>
- AlJazeera, France evacuates more than 300 people from Afghanistan (Dec. 4 2021),
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/4/update-1-france-evacuates-more-than-300-people-from-afghanistan>
- Lighthouse Reports, France's forgotten Afghan spies (April 12, 2023),
<https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/frances-forgotten-afghan-spies/>

Netherlands

- Government of the Netherlands, FAQ on reception following evacuation,
<https://www.government.nl/topics/afghanistan/faq-about-reception-in-the-netherlands-following-evacuation-from-afghanistan>.
- NL Times on the embassy-guards appeal ruling (Nov. 4, 2025),
<https://nltimes.nl/2025/11/04/court-rules-netherlands-obliged-evacuate-42-afghan-embassy-guards>.
- DutchNews on the embassy-guards appeal ruling (Nov. 2025),
<https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/11/appeal-court-rejects-resettlement-claim-by-afghan-embassy-guards/>.
- De Jong, S. and D. Sarantidis, Divided in Leaving Together: The resettlement of Afghan locally employed staff - A comparison between Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US (May 2022),
<https://www.york.ac.uk/media/politics/documents/research/Divided%20in%20Leaving%20Together.pdf>

- Letter on behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Anne-Marie Snels, (July 16, 2026), reference BZ2626505.
- Afghaanse tolken vragen uitzonderingspositie na besluit over verblijfsvergunning, (June 19, 2026),
<https://nos.nl/artikel/2619313-afghaanse-tolken-vragen-uitzonderingspositie-na-besluit-over-verblijfsvergunning>

Spain

- Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, press note on Afghan operations (Aug. 11, 2022),
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/Comunicacion/NotasPrensa/Paginas/2022_NOTAS_P/20220811_NOTA065.aspx.

Czechia and the rest of the coalition

- BalkanInsight / Reporting Democracy (Sept. 10, 2021),
<https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/10/democracy-digest-slovakia-and-czechia-join-the-afghan-hounding/>.
- Italian Ministry of Defence, Operazione Aquila Omnia,
<https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/op-intern-corso/op-aquila-omnia/>.
- The Local Norway on Norwegian evacuation figures (Sept. 1, 2021),
<https://www.thelocal.no/20210901>.
- Government of Sweden, engagement in Afghanistan,
<https://www.government.se/articles/2021/08/swedens-engagement-in-afghanistan/>.
- European Commission / Al Jazeera on the 40,000-place EU pledge (Dec. 9, 2021),
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/9/eu-member-states-agree-to-take-in-40000-afghan-asylum-seekers>.
- UNHCR / ReliefWeb on Afghan refugees in Brazil (Nov. 2023),
<https://reliefweb.int/report/brazil/protection-and-assistance-afghan-refugees-brazil-special-edition-november-2023>.
- RefugeesWelcome, Evacuated Afghans are giving up on Denmark (Feb 13, 2022),
<https://refugeeswelcome.dk/en/information/focus/evacuated-afghans-are-giving-up-on-denmark>
- Sweden Herald, Swedish Military Employee in Afghanistan Killed by Taliban, (July 2, 2025),
<https://swedenherald.com/article/swedish-military-employee-in-afghanistan-killed-by-taliban>
- Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Another evacuee from Afghanistan arrives in Tallinn (Sept. 7, 2021), <https://vm.ee/en/news/another-evacuee-afghanistan-arrives-tallinn>

- Migri - Ministry of the Interior, Flight carrying people evacuated from Afghanistan has arrived in Finland (Aug. 23, 2021), <https://vm.fi/en/-/1410869/flight-carrying-people-evacuated-from-afghanistan-has-arrived-in-finland>
- YLE, Friday's papers: Abandoned security guards, digital age divide, Tampere adjusting to trams (Nov 15, 2021), <https://yle.fi/a/3-12175379>
- Helsinki Times, 'Finland was late to recognise need, unprepared to evacuate Afghans, researchers tell YLE' (Sept 13, 2021), <https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/19950-finland-was-late-to-recognise-need-unprepared-to-evacuate-afghans-researchers-tell-yle.html>

Vietnam and Indochina

- U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art & Archives, "Refugee Crisis," <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/APA/Historical-Essays/Growing-Diversity/Refugee-Crisis/>.
- Pew Research Center on public opinion toward refugees, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/11/19/u-s-public-seldom-has-welcomed-refugees-into-country/>.
- Pew Research Center, Vietnamese-American fact sheet, <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/fact-sheet/asian-americans-vietnamese-in-the-u-s/>.
- International Rescue Committee, "The largest refugee resettlement effort in American history," <https://www.rescue.org/article/largest-refugee-resettlement-effort-american-history>.
- Refugee Act of 1980, S.643, 96th Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/senate-bill/643>.
- Snepp, F. (2002). *Decent Interval: Decent Interval*: University Press of Kansas.

Iraq

- Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 / FY2008 NDAA, S.1651, 110th Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/1651>.
- Congressional Research Service, *Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs*, R43725, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43725>.
- International Refugee Assistance Project, statement on the Iraqi Direct Access Program suspension, <https://refugeerights.org/news-resources/press-release-irap-statement-on-the-suspension-of-the-iraqi-direct-access-program>.

Former Yugoslavia

- BBC, Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths - court (Sept. 6, 2013), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23986063>
- Amnesty International, Netherlands Supreme Court hands down historic judgment over Srebrenica genocide (Sept, 6, 2013), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/09/netherlands-supreme-court-hands-down-historic-judgment-over-srebrenica-genoc/>
- The State of the Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanović, International Crimes Database, <https://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1005/The-Netherlands-v-Nuhanovi%C4%87/>

The Harkis

- David Sutton, "Reprisal Violence and the Harkis in French Algeria, 1962," *The International History Review* (2016), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2016.1141307>.
- Government of France, harkis.gouv.fr, on the presidential acknowledgments, <https://www.harkis.gouv.fr/les-harkis/demande-de-pardon-de-la-france>.
- Le Monde Diplomatique, Les « harkis » de Kaboul (Oct. 2020), <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2020/10/ORY/62293>
- <https://www.w24news.com/news/w24news-hundreds-of-afghan-harkis-who-aided-the-french-army-abandoned-in-afghanistan/>

The Kurds

- U.S. Air Force Historical Support Division, "1991, Operation Provide Comfort," <https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458953/1991-operation-provide-comfort-and-northern-watch/>.

The Montagnards

- NCpedia (UNC Press), "Montagnards," <https://www.ncpedia.org/montagnards>.
- Human Rights Watch, "Vietnam: Violence Against Montagnards During Easter Week Protests" (2004), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/04/14/vietnam-violence-against-montagnards-during-easter-week-protests>.
- VFW Magazine, "Montagnards Find Home in North Carolina" (2019), <https://www.vfw.org/media-and-events/latest-releases/archives/2019/4/montagnards-find-home-in-north-carolina>.

The Hmong

- Minnesota Historical Society, Hmong Timeline, <https://www.mnhs.org/hmong/hmong-timeline>.

- Pew Research Center, "Hmong in the U.S." fact sheet, <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/fact-sheet/asian-americans-hmong-in-the-u-s/>.

The Moluccans

- Steijlen, G. (2012). Closing the "KNIL chapter"; A key moment in identity formation of Moluccans in the Netherlands in: Post-colonial immigrants and identity formations in the Netherlands (ed. U. Bosma). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Guardian, Dutch PM apologises for Moluccan soldiers' mistreatment after Indonesian independence (June 21, 2026), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/21/dutch-pm-apologises-moluccan-soldiers-indonesia-independence>
- Dutch Government, Toespraak minister-president Rob Jetten bij inhuldiging Nationaal Moluks Monument Ulu Kora (June 21, 2026), <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/2026/06/21/toespraak-minister-president-jetten-bij-inhuldiging-nationaal-moluks-monument-ulu-kora>
- Minority Rights Group, Moluccans in the Netherlands, <https://minorityrights.org/communities/moluccans/>

Filipino World War II veterans

- Rescission Act of 1946.
- U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Filipino Veterans Equity Compensation Fund (2009), <https://www.va.gov>.
- Filipino Veterans of World War II Congressional Gold Medal Act, S.1555, 114th Congress (2016), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1555>.

The Assyrian Levies

- British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, "Missionary involvement with the Simele massacre in 1933" (2023), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2023.2233218>.

Mali

- BDÜ, Kein zweites Kabul: Deutschland muss Sicherheit der Ortskräfte in Mali gewährleisten! (Nov. 22, 2023), <https://bdue.de/aktuell/news-detail/kein-zweites-kabul-deutschland-muss-sicherheit-der-ortskraefte-in-mali-gewaehrleisten>
- TAZ, Kein Rettungsplan für Mali-Helfer (Aug. 14, 2023), <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2023-08/mali-ortskraefte-bundeswehr-schutz>

- Die Zeit, Malische Bundeswehr-Ortskräfte bitten Deutschland offenbar um Schutz (Aug. 14, 2023),
<https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2023-08/mali-ortskraefte-bundeswehr-schutz>
- PEN International, Mali: Open Letter to German ministers regarding the resettlement of Malian interpreters/LECs (Aug. 26, 2022),
<https://www.pen-international.org/news/mali-open-letter-to-german-ministers>

Legal Reports and Litigation

- Local Staff International and University of York (January 2026) *Falling Between the Cracks of the Law: Legal Protection and Advocacy for Local Staff*,
https://www.localstaffinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/LSI-Report-Legal-Advocacy-Falling-Between-the-Cracks-of-Law_WebPub.docx.pdf

The Frameworks

- AfghanEvac. Global Alliance, *Finishing the Mission. Setting the Standard. Never Again.* (2026). <https://afghanevac.org/global-alliance>
- De Jong, S. and B. Fisher (2026) *Falling Between The Cracks Of Law Legal Protection & Advocacy For Local Staff*. Berlin: Local Staff International.
https://www.localstaffinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/LSI-Report-Legal-Advocacy-Falling-Between-the-Cracks-of-Law_WebPub.docx.pdf
- Local Staff International and University of York (March 2026). *Guidelines for the Rights and Protection of Local Staff in International Missions*.
https://www.localstaffinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Guidelines-for-the-Rights-and-Protection-of-Local-Staff_FINAL_WebPub.pdf

Figures reflect the most recent available reporting as of August 2026.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report compares how the United States and its allied nations have kept, or broken, faith with the wartime partners who served alongside them.



AFGHANEVAC

AfghanEvac is an organization working to fulfill America's promise to our Afghan wartime allies. For questions about this report or the underlying data, contact AfghanEvac at contact@afghanevac.org, or find this and other reports online at reports.afghanevac.org.

LOCAL STAFF INTERNATIONAL

Local Staff International advocates for the local staff who serve alongside foreign missions and militaries worldwide, empowering local staff and advancing global commitment to those who serve.



afghanevac.org

An AfghanEvac Special Report · August 12, 2026

© 2026 #AfghanEvac
Every figure sourced